Ethical Challenges of Germline Genetic Enhancement by Roqué, María Victoria et al.
1 September 2019 | Volume 10 | Article 767
REVIEW
doi: 10.3389/fgene.2019.00767
published: 03 September 2019
Frontiers in Genetics | www.frontiersin.org
Ethical Challenges of Germline 
Genetic Enhancement
Ignacio Macpherson 1,2*, María Victoria Roqué 1,2 and Ignacio Segarra 2,3
1 Department of Humanities, International University of Catalonia, Barcelona, Spain, 2 Pharmacokinetics, Patient Care and 
Translational Bioethics Research Group, Catholic University of Murcia (UCAM), Murcia, Spain, 3 Department of Pharmacy, 
Faculty of Health Sciences, Catholic University of Murcia (UCAM), Murcia, Spain
The new reproductive technologies have opened the door to different processes of 
germline genetic enhancement by which the characteristics of an individual according 
to the interests of the agents involved could be selected during its gestation. Although 
the initiative is apparently oriented towards developing individuals that would excel in 
society, critical voices raise the concerns about that this approach would generate and 
need for a reflection on the ethical, social and legal implications of these techniques and 
their implementation in society. We reviewed the literature about these issues throughout 
their historical records to date, focusing on the moral arguments and non-clinical 
aspects that affect the legal and social environment. We have observed various trends of 
thought with divergent positions (proactive, preventive, and regulatory) as well as a large 
number of articles that try to reconcile the different approaches. This review illustrates 
a series of concepts from the ethics and philosophy fields which are frequently used 
in studies that evaluate the ethical implications of germline genetic enhancement, such 
as dignity, benefit, autonomy, and identity. In addition, amongst the many unresolved 
controversies surrounding genetic enhancement, we identify procreative beneficence, 
genetic disassociation, gender selection, the value of disability, embryo chimerization, 
and the psychosocial inequality of potentially enhanced individuals as crucial. We also 
develop possible scenarios for future debate. We consider especially important the 
definition and specification of three aspects which are essential for the deployment of new 
reproductive technologies: the moral status of the embryo undergoing enhancement, the 
legal status of the enhanced individual, and the responsibility of the agents executing the 
enhancement. Finally, we propose the precautionary principle as a means to navigate 
ethical uncertainties.
Keywords: genetic enhancement, human identity, genetic interventions, reprogenetic, human procreation, 
precautionary principle, ELSI
INTRODUCTION
The interest for the physical, moral, or cognitive well-being of all human individuals and its 
transmission to following generations has existed in the minds of the wise and rulers for thousands 
of years. Accomplishing this objective demands to specify the means to reach it, something especially 
difficult when it comes to transmitting the biological features of parents to children, that is, the 
genetic inheritance. Throughout history, civilizations have implemented various means to achieve 
the correct transmission of biological inheritance, generally through negative laws that forbid the 
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pairing of consanguineous individuals as well as incest (Bittles, 
2003). In these cases, the laws were not intended to “enhance” 
the inherited characteristics rather to avoid the emergence of 
diseases or inbred disabilities (Güvercin and Arda, 2008), and 
the “worsening” of the offspring. However, in Plato’s Republic 
we may find the formulation of one of the first political theories 
trying to enhance the individuals of a society with proactive 
means. Amongst Plato’s proposals we may find the selection of 
couples, the controlled inbreeding and crossing, the classification 
of newborns and their upbringing, or abandonment according 
to their physiological characteristics (Güvercin and Arda, 2008). 
The genetic enhancement proposal appeared again strongly at 
the end of the 19th century and for the first time its postulates 
were put together by Galton and triggered a series of measures in 
Western society that sought to improve the genetic inheritance, 
not only of the physiological characteristics of the population but 
also their intellectual and moral capacities. The means to achieve 
such improvement included marriage restrictions, selective 
sterilizations and control of immigration (Galton, 1904). Later, 
after the Second World War, these approaches were stigmatized 
after the Nuremberg trials and became banned, although not in 
practice in several countries (Tännsjö, 1998; Yap, 2007).
Thus, during the 80s of the last century, a second approach 
took place with a series of measures focused on preventing the 
spread of the disability–and disabled subjects–in society (Hens 
et al., 2013; Thompson, 2017). These measures included prenatal 
diagnosis, favored by the approval of abortion laws. Shortly 
after, techniques for preimplantation genetic diagnosis and 
screening, thanks to the development of assisted reproduction 
techniques, were largely implemented. All this prompted a new 
legislation that was progressively adapted to new demands of 
society (Fagot-Largeault, 1987). Simultaneously, dissenting 
voices appeared that criticized the commodification of human 
life, its conditioning and its designing (Hirschman, 1991). 
Contrary, other authors emerged criticizing the alarmism and 
encouraging the development of suitable legislation to avoid 
abuses (Resnik, 1994). Consequently, the role of independent, 
third party institutions become essential to evaluate the ethical 
dimension of the new techniques (Pergament and Bonnicksen, 
1994) and fostered new regulations based on empirical data 
and not on moral abstractions (Bonnicksen, 1994). In this line, 
for example, the AMA Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs 
put forward the criteria for accepting prenatal diagnosis and 
preimplantation genetic diagnosis, provided it was directed 
to therapeutic ends (AMA, 1994; Agar, 1995; Nicholson 
et al., 1995). Even so, the preventive selection of embryos, the 
manufacture of experimental embryos and the accumulation of 
cryopreserved embryos, led to new debates. As the therapeutic 
purpose became more diffuse or gave way to enhancement 
interventions, the debates shifted towards aspects such as the 
identity, benefit and dignity of the new creatures (Agar, 1995; 
Davis, 1995; Vines, 1995; Glannon, 1998).
A new phase was initiated in the 90s when novel cloning 
technology was developed and proposed for the acquisition 
or improvement of capabilities which are above the “normal” 
parameters for a human being (Richter and Bacchetta, 1998; 
Scully and Rehmann-Sutter, 2001; Greely, 2004). This new 
approach was called “enhancement” and included the acquisition 
of physiological, genetic, cognitive, and moral capabilities 
(Faust, 2008; Gordon-Solmon, 2015; DeGrazia, 2016). From 
the mid-1990s to the present, various initiatives have appeared 
trying to apply genetic enhancement to the individual for non-
therapeutic purposes by means of manipulating, eliminating, 
or incorporating specific genes in adult subjects or in the 
germline (Blackburn, 2004). What makes this new phase in quite 
distinctive is the implication that the intervened individual will 
survive, will transmit his/her genes and will become a subject of 
rights. The appearance of Dolly, a cloned sheep in 1997, would 
start this new period including social alarm before the unknown 
and reactions calling for legislative caution. In 1997, both 
American and European legislation proposed a ban on human 
cloning (Newman, 2003; Hildt, 2016) which only had territorial 
influence. Despite these bans, there have been proposals for 
new therapies that take advantage of newer genetic technologies 
and which are loaded with controversy, such as human cloning 
involving nuclear transfer (Robertson, 1998), mitochondrial 
replacement (Rubenstein et al., 1995; Richter and Bacchetta, 
1998), modification of the genomic map (Agar, 1995; MacKay 
et al., 1997), and genetic edition CRISP/Cas9 (Ishii, 2017a; Ishii, 
2017b). Although the regulatory warnings seemed unanimous, 
the legislations were progressively adapted to the evolution of 
the different research evaluation committees. Therefore, there is 
a greater development of ethical objections and restrictions to 
research on severe medical conditions in some associations such 
as ESHG and ESHRE which remain more inclined to encourage 
social debate and to establish a moratorium (De Wert et al., 2018). 
However, other associations such as ASHG and NASM tend to 
raise the social and political problems involved in conducting 
this research (Lyon, 2017).
This new paradigm (“enhancement”) raises a recurrent 
question in the general health care field: what is the 
threshold between therapy and enhancement to intervene? 
Undoubtedly, the will to cure, intrinsic to the medical 
profession, is at its best in the effort to develop therapies 
targeting the cause of the problem, be it at the functional 
origin or at the structural level. In this context, gene therapy 
is a medical intervention which is considered proportionate 
in its intention and in its means — to recover lost health 
according to what it is to a human individual. On the contrary, 
genetic enhancement would try to modify non-pathological 
human traits and optimize capabilities in the individuals 
(NHGRI, 2018). Without a doubt there exists an intrinsic 
desire for the human zenith, constructed on a theoretical 
conception of what a perfect human being ought to be. And 
it is precisely this vision that is currently being challenged 
and questioned: the very concept of human identity, paired 
with succeeding questions: is that identity immutable? Are 
there arguments for not modifying it? And how far can it be 
modified? (Bostrom and Sandberg, 2009; Greenbaum, 2013; 
Macpherson and Segarra, 2017), and what are the long-term 
psychological and social consequences on individuals and 
populations (GüellPelayo, 2014; Cabrera, 2017; Ishii, 2017b)? 
In fact, all these issues frame the ethical challenges of “genetic 
enhancement” and, specifically, the genetic enhancement 
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applied to the individual’s germline, aimed to improve the 
capabilities of the human subject.
These interventions are becoming an incipient new field 
of bioethics where the ELSI perspective is essential at its core 
(Henderson et al., 2012; Greenbaum, 2013; Macpherson and 
Segarra, 2017; Ishii, 2017a; Ishii, 2017b; De Melo-Martín, 2018; 
Tamir, 2018). This perspective permeates and affects all legislation 
of the clinical and pharmacology fields, subject to strict ethical 
controls, and associated to the precautionary principle (Gonzalvo-
Cirac et al., 2013). This principle is applied in other fields too, such 
as protection of the environment (Rippe and Willemsen, 2018). In 
this context, a key question arises: is this sensitivity regarding the 
environment also present for genetic enhancement interventions 
in the individual’s germline? To answer this question, we carried 
out a literature review on the moral dimension of the problem 
and its non-clinical argumentation, that is, the argumentation 
generated in the process to assess the ethical dimensions to reject 
or support genetic enhancement carried out in the germline 
(Sparrow, 2014b; De Wert et al., 2018).
TRENDS
There is an on-going debate on germline genetic enhancement 
within the public media and amongst specialists (Henderson 
et al., 2012) which manifests certain distrust towards solutions 
coming from the field of philosophy (Hayry, 2003; Coggon, 2011; 
Selgelid, 2014). This leads scientific debates to commonly end up 
on discussions around the political and ideological spheres with 
trends which oscillate between the so-called bioconservatives 
versus bioliberals factions (Roache and Savulescu, 2016). Both of 
them fluctuate between the anxiety before a new unpredictable 
technology and the demystification of their dangers (Cartier-
Lacave et al., 2016). Even so, there is no shortage of attempts 
to reconcile both tendencies and seek a third way (Roduit 
et al., 2013; Shapshay, 2012; Qiu, 2016) that is able to integrate 
elements of both. For this reason, we have synthesized the 
reflections extracted from the various studies and grouped them 
into three main trends: preventive, proactive, and regulatory. It is 
worth noting that these tendencies show certain intertwining of 
their authors’ arguments and opinions but keeping their different 
starting points.
a) Preventive trend. This trend groups diverse currents of 
thought whose common element is the attempt to preserve 
the human nature from the initiatives of germinal line 
modification. The studies in this group contain reflections 
from the Christian tradition (Polkinghorne, 2004; 
Massmann, 2018) and deontological philosophy (Jensen, 
2011; Kim, 2017). They caution about the risk of modifying 
the essential element of human corporality, the DNA. The 
most representative author is Habermas (2003), who tries 
to analyze the reasons why we do not accept inherited 
nature and therefore would want to modify it genetically. 
It is an approach already evoked by other philosophers 
such as Kirkegard, Heidegger, or Jonas (Malmqvist, 2007; 
Christiansen, 2009), but Habermas goes a step further and 
argues that genetic enhancement in germline is to use the 
human being which may end up ‘making use’ of his being. 
From Habermas’s perspective, the preservation of the 
“non-chosen” or inherited nature, would protect us from 
ourselves (Neil, 2008), a protection that could be radically 
degraded if market laws were deployed in the reproductive 
industry (Fox, 2008). These laws would eventually 
determine the criteria for any action facing enhancement, 
including genetic doping (Gaffney and Parisotto, 2007; 
McKanna and Toriello, 2010), gene patents (Rodriguez, 
2016; Du, 2018; Greenbaum, 2011), or competition 
between enhanced beings (Jensen, 2011). An additional 
critical approach may be added, fueled by the instability 
and insecurity of reprogenetic techniques leading to 
unpredictable consequences, in which case, use would be 
irresponsible (Fox, 2010; GüellPelayo, 2014; Hildt, 2016; 
Newman, 2017; Fox, 2018). This would be particularly 
relevant regarding the modification of the germline by 
genetic editing techniques (Niklas et al., 2015; Reagan, 
2015; Sykora, 2015; Qiu, 2016). In summary, these studies 
may suggest that a balanced equation of risks and benefits 
would not suffice to determine the ethical assessment and 
morality of a technique. Rather, deeper understanding 
of key concepts identity, nature and dignity is necessary 
(Chan, 2015; De Melo-Martín, 2018; Jensen, 2018).
b) Proactive trend. This trend rejects any intellectual barrier to 
research and claims to investigate freely, expanding knowledge, 
and eliminating alarmism (Harris, 2015). Therefore, they 
propose to overcome the precautionary principle and dismiss 
the arguments of the slippery slope in order to avoid slowing 
down the development of science (Pattinson, 2000; Bailey, 
2001; Bernal, 2005). Thus, these authors propose cloning 
of germline DNA without any barriers (Robertson, 1998); 
the non-therapeutic purposes of preimplantation genetic 
diagnosis to select the individual’s features (Roberts, 2002; 
Sperling, 2011); the desire for greater intelligence by means of 
the selection of alleles (Kirk, 2003); or the selection of children 
according to their human potential (Gordon-Solmon, 2015), 
even if these initiatives were theoretical and utopian. It is 
common in these studies to denounce the impediments of 
moral restrictions (Smith et al., 2012; Murphy, 2014) and the 
cautions against cloning and genetic editing (Bernal, 2005; 
Fenton, 2006; Resnik and Vorhaus, 2006; Powell et al., 2012) 
although there is also moderate unwillingness to create hybrids 
between species (Robert and Baylis, 2003; Savulescu, 2003). 
In general, any opposition from philosophical, religious or 
political origin to scientific progress is questioned (Roberts, 
2002; Brooke, 2004; Smolin, 2004) and a more empirical, less 
speculative analysis is pursued (Chyrowicz, 2001; Blackburn, 
2004; Selgelid, 2014). These studies transmit the perception 
that there are social needs which are imperative to meet 
urgently and any attempt to hinder (obstaculizar) this process 
may be considered an attack, not only to progress, but also to 
social and global welfare.
c) Regulatory trend. Another group of studies shows great 
sensitivity for the consequences, positive and negative, 
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that may accompany genetic enhancement and try to solve it 
by proposing the need for clear legislation as a result of a public, 
open, and reflective debate (Marden and Nelkin, 2000). This 
trend tries to be an in-between solution between the positions 
of the two previous trends (Evitt et al., 2015; Thompson 
2017). The regulatory trend anchors its main argument on the 
utilitarian pragmatism approach. Thus, it proposes decisions 
based on the function they may generate on the individual and 
in society. At the same time, this tendency considers essential 
to rely on strong laws to avoid abuses, keeping open to debate 
certain interventions, marked by individual or social need: e.g. 
cloning for sterile couples (Strong, 1998), the elimination of 
defective embryos (Verlinsky, 2005), the selection of embryos 
with antisocial genes (Tabery, 2009), the gamete planning 
(Delaney, 2011) or the experimentation with embryos 
without procreative purposes (De Miguel Beriain, 2019). At 
the same time, supporters of this regulatory approach also 
show concern for the social implications (Marden and Nelkin, 
2000), especially injustice and inequality that could generate 
(Shapiro, 2005; Sparrow, 2015). There is, therefore, a great 
sensitivity to understand the consequences (Mehlman, 2003, 
Mehlman, 2005; Delaney, 2011; Anomaly, 2018) and a special 
interest to ensure coherent, global and coordinated legislation 
(Mackenzie, 2005; Ishii, 2014; Kaebnick, 2017; Kanaris, 2017; 
Lyon, 2017; Ishii, 2017a; Ishii, 2017b; Liao, 2019).
CONCEPTS
As indicated above, studies on genetic enhancement on the 
germline employ concepts which are used beyond the scientific–
experimental dimensions of the problem and reach an ethical–
logical dimension, more typical of philosophical approaches 
(Shapiro, 2005). This review has allowed us to highlight four 
significant concepts that are embedded in all debates and 
discussions addressing genetic enhancement: benefit, autonomy, 
identity, and dignity. Moreover, its significance differs in the 
various trends (Table 1) and a short-term consensus on its 
importance and relevance is not foreseen.
a) Benefit. This is the focus of the discussion which configures the 
basis of the enhancement and is determined by the good that 
is pursued. For this reason, it is frequently addressed in most 
studies. The concept has been linked to the difference between 
the concepts “therapy” and “enhancement” which could also 
be interpreted as antagonists between the actions to “recover 
capacities” and means to “add capabilities” (Du, 2018; 
Thompson, 2017). Based on this divergence, a first reflection 
looks into the value of the arguments promoting genetic 
enhancement in germline (Neil, 2008) if the questions of what 
and why to enhance are not solved beforehand (Henrich, 
2011). A second reflection comes out from the supposed 
benefit or harm caused through modification of the DNA, 
the genes or the human identity (Ebbesen and Jensen, 2006; 
Fenton, 2010). Some authors consider that modifications of 
human nature are advantageous (Powell et al., 2012), while 
others consider it detrimental to human beings, due to the 
potential corruption of the human genome (Sykora, 2015). In 
any case, the term benefit seems to be the most used amongst 
the authors and the foundation to carry out improvement and 
enhancement interventions.
b) Autonomy. The subject’s autonomy is a condition present 
sine qua non in any human initiative and makes possible 
the subject’s informed consent. Thus, can reprogenetics 
cause detriment to individual autonomy? The answer seems 
very controversial (Mameli, 2007; Murphy, 2014; Schenker, 
1997) due to deficient criteria with a comprehensive 
ethical assessment (Selgelid, 2014). However, since the 
implementation of embryo selection techniques by means 
of prenatal diagnosis and preimplantation genetic diagnosis, 
there is a perception that these interventions may alter the 
autonomy of manipulated individuals (Malmqvist, 2007; 
Henrich, 2011). This is especially evident when genetic 
enhancement is pursued: First, there are two wills which 
merge, the will of those responsible for the enhancement 
(e.g. parents, guardians or institutions) and the will of the 
enhanced individual (Tamir, 2018) which may not always 
coincide. Furthermore, a second dilemma is posed: the 
autonomy of parents who want to have a child may be deeply 
conditioned by the balance between their personal interests 
and the altruism of their action (Gordon-Solmon, 2015; 
DeGrazia, 2016; Jensen, 2018).
c) Identity. In its classical conception, human identity is considered 
what characterizes the human individual. It is a concept 
that integrates the biological basis and the rational features 
of the human being. Often it is assimilated to the concept 
of Aristotelian nature, as described by Habermas (2003). 
TABLE 1 | Summary of trends from the description of the main concepts.
Trend Concepts
Benefit Autonomy Identity Dignity
Preventive The human good is the 
perfection of its being
Limited by the dignity of the individual Determined by its nature, beyond its 
natural conditions
Based on its ontological 
nature 
Proactive The human good is the 
individual’s well-being (a  
good life)
Limited exclusively by the biological 
laws
Determined by their will, based on 
technological advances
Based on the development 
of its capabilities
Regulatory The human good is the 
consensual social well-being
Limited by the laws that regulate 
society 
Determined by social consensus after 
an open and regulated debate 
Based on consensual 
legislation
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However, a new definition and conceptualization of the 
meaning of identity seeks to include new technologies of 
genetic transformation (Shapiro, 2005) and other aspects 
such as autonomy, interpersonal relationships and longevity 
(Glannon and Harris, 2002). Nowadays, the lack of clear 
meaning and definition of the term identity is causing 
confusion in the debate on mitochondrial replacement and 
nuclear transfer techniques, as well as the proper identity of 
embryoids and chimaeras (Scott, 2017; De Miguel Beriain, 
2019). In addition, the dilemmas of social identity of 
children generated in vitro including confused filiation which 
consequences have not yet been studied in depth (Rose and 
Novas, 2005; Lock and Nguyen, 2010) are added to the above 
problems. It is generally assumed that the concept of identity 
will be decisive to guide reflections on the moral status of the 
embryo (DeGrazia, 2012; Francis, 2015).
d) Dignity. It is the most discussed concept in the debate 
on germline genetic enhancement and it is strongly 
contextualized and linked to the concept of identity 
(Savulescu, 2003). In spite of being used repeatedly, it is not 
well defined in the debate and it remains unclear (Henrich, 
2011). Originally, this concept was mostly discussed in the 
debate on cloning (Caulfield, 2003), chimerization (Robert 
and Baylis, 2003; De Melo-Martín, 2008), and cryopreserved 
embryos (Glannon and Harris, 2002; Ehrich et al., 2010). 
Hence there have been repeated attempts to develop new 
conceptualizations rooted on neurological basis, consensual 
basis or rational basis (Bostrom and Sandberg, 2009; 
Jotterand, 2010; Chan, 2015). Undoubtedly, Habermas 
is the author who develops most deeply this term, dignity 
(p.29) (Habermas, 2003) in the field of genetics, especially 
due to its relationship with the concept of human nature. 
This concept would confer an infinite value to the fact of 
being human which would grow to be the foundation for an 
unconditional respect towards individuals and their human 
rights (Habermas, 2003; Christiansen, 2009).
CURRENT CONTROVERSIES
Next, we deal with the main aspects that have caused greater 
controversy in scientific, technological, legal, or philosophical 
forums about the existence of a human genetic identity and the 
free initiative to modify that identity (Mehlman, 2003). This 
framework does not include other types of human improvement 
that science puts forward–physiological, cognitive or moral 
improvement through external elements such as drugs, surgery, 
or somatic genes–even if the focus remains similar: the happiness 
and well-being of individuals (Bostrom and Sandberg, 2009; 
Savulescu et al., 2011). The fundamental difference of these 
tendencies with genetic enhancement in germline lies in a 
concept previously mentioned: the autonomy of the individual. 
The recipients of the genetic enhancement have not chosen to be 
better, something that is required for any other pharmacological, 
neuronal, or surgical improvement, which usually includes free, 
informed consent. Therefore, we focus on specific areas in which 
genetic improvement affects the fundamental rights (including 
future identity, dignity, and good lifetime) of individuals which 
are especially vulnerable and without autonomy, such as embryos 
or a newborn (Liao, 2019).
Procreative Beneficence
Faced with the technology available and the possibility of 
predictably beneficial enhancements, a question comes out 
unstoppably: should not the selection of genes be mandatory? 
Shouldn’t governments be allowed to promote or prevent certain 
genes upon citizens in a similar way as it is done with vaccination 
programs (Kanaris, 2017; So et al., 2017)? Anticipating these 
issues, Savulescu developed what would be called “the Principle 
of Procreative Beneficence” by which parents would be morally 
obliged to discard an embryo with potential criminal genes and 
at the same time choose the embryos that have the most favorable 
genes for himself and for society (Savulescu, 2001; Savulescu 
et al., 2006). This issue was already an old controversy, which 
was raised even before the emergence of prenatal diagnostic 
techniques and preimplantation genetic diagnosis: the obligation 
of the principle of beneficence against the foreseeable diseases 
present in the embryo, e.g. Huntington disease, Asperger 
syndrome, Down syndrome, cancer, cystic fibrosis, and spina 
bifida amongst others (Harris, 2006; Walsh, 2010; Bosslet, 2011), 
removing the procreative autonomy of the parents (Faust, 2008; 
DeGrazia, 2016). This state-driven intervention approach to 
eliminate the supposed “antisocial” embryos has been strongly 
criticized (Tabery, 2009; Bosslet, 2011) due to the fact that it 
would require a substantial drift in the defense of human rights: it 
would not differentiate between a desire for moral enhancement 
and a mandatory action to implement it (Saunders, 2015). The 
root of this disruption may be found in the moral imperative–
the moral good as obligation–and its mandatory application 
leading to morally designed individuals (Holland, 2016). In the 
same line, psychological pressure on parents would be especially 
significant (Bonte et al., 2014) to encourage them to choose 
the “best” embryo amongst several, that would be the most 
“valuable,” “intelligent” or “excellent,” a quantification attitude 
that would seem incoherent, or at least surprising, for parents 
with unconditional affection for any of their children (Tonkens, 
2011; Jensen, 2018). Therefore, some authors have taken another 
approach and are inclined to transform the obligation into 
suggestion, option or advice (Jacobs, 2015; Carter, 2015; Francis, 
2015; Sparrow, 2015; Kanaris, 2017; Liao, 2019).
The Value of the Disability
The principle of procreative beneficence raises a new question: 
who is entitled to decide what an advantage is (Karpin, 2007; 
Macpherson and Segarra, 2017)? It is not clear whether some 
enhancements are desirable per se or whether a disability is 
deprived of any value (Nunes, 2006; Francis, 2015). According 
to the expressivist objection current, the elimination of disabilities 
would be a loss of human identity for those who suffer them 
(Alper et al., 2002; Malek, 2010; Collins et al. 2016; Shakespeare 
et al., 2017). Within the same context, then, we consider how 
negative interventions should be assessed: the selection of 
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features that we may consider detrimental for the future child, 
e.g. deafness or Asperger, may also present some kind of benefit 
(Karpin, 2007; Walsh, 2010; Graber, 2017). Would there be 
an obligation to avoid them? At this point, some authors have 
raised the concept of the “asymmetry of the damage,” by which 
the benefit of living with a disability would not compensate the 
damage of having it (Glannon and Harris, 2002; Sparrow, 2012; 
Francis, 2015). Furthermore, the anti-equality shadow appears 
simultaneously, either by genetic enhancement or by embryonic 
selection technologies, since their application effectively would 
impose social segregation between the enhanced individuals and 
the non-enhanced subjects, who would identify themselves with 
the disabled (Cavaliere, 2018). It is here where the legal regulatory 
bodies need to deepen the knowledge and the consequences 
of their implementation since mandatory actions to eradicate 
disability could lead to the extermination of full groups (Kanaris, 
2017; Thompson, 2017; Ishii, 2017a).
Gender Selection
Undoubtedly, sex selection for non-therapeutic reasons has 
already generated a multitude of controversies (Arnold et al., 
2002; Sperling, 2011; Winckler, 2002). Currently, a new debate 
is taking place regarding the advantage or disadvantage of 
sexual dimorphism (Sparrow, 2010a) focused on the supposed 
“normality” of the existence of two sexes and whether one should 
prevail over the other (Kahane and Savulescu, 2010; Slatman 
et al., 2010; Sparrow, 2010b; Sparrow, 2012). If that normality 
were to be questioned, would it be justifiable to eliminate sexual 
dimorphism and select the best female or male genes to design 
an asexual being (Kahane and Savulescu, 2010)? This proposal 
could even go as far as to suggest the mandatory choice of the 
female subject by the tutors or the reproductive leaders upon 
consideration and assumption that the most aggressive genes 
would come from the male individual, an extremely controversial 
trait (Slatman et al., 2010; Sparrow, 2012; Casal, 2013). According 
to other authors, this debate is insubstantial in nature because 
sexual dimorphism has a neutral effect on human development 
(Kahane and Savulescu, 2010) and the normality of each of the 
sexes is accepted (Sparrow, 2012). In spite of everything, the 
appearance of ectogenetic technologies will possibly repeat the 
controversies generated when the embryo selection techniques 
were and currently are applied to sex selection (Kendal, 2017).
Creation of Chimeras, Hybrids, and 
Embryoids
Their creation has always raised rejection. The recent change of 
social mindset has been preceded by their potential usefulness 
in research, primarily related to therapeutics (Brickman and 
Serup, 2017). This approach was fueled when IVF surplus human 
embryos began to be used to produce stem cells, thus justifying 
the elimination of any restriction on embryonic experimentation 
(Robert and Baylis, 2003; Savulescu, 2003; Ehrich et al., 2010; 
Volarevic et al., 2018; De Miguel Beriain, 2019). In spite of 
everything, the doubt and aversion have persisted due to the 
uncertainty of the moral status of the hybrid human–animal 
individual (Streiffer, 2005; Kaebnick, 2017). Moreover, this 
uncertainty acquires special relevance when the human–
animal interaction may affect the brain structure and 
functionality as well as the gametes (Dolgin, 2016; Levine and 
Grabel, 2017). The current trends range from the elimination 
of any restriction due to lack of ethical reasons, to the 
concern for individual and societal consequences (Palacios-
González, 2015; Hyun, 2016; Rodriguez, 2016). We believe 
that the solution can only be developed departing from a clear 
conceptualization of their moral status, a term still not agreed 
upon for embryos and much less for chimeras (Giacomini 
et al., 2007; De Melo-Martín, 2008; Eberl and Ballard, 2009; 
Chan, 2015; Munsie et al., 2017; Hübner, 2018).
Genetic Untying
The problem of genetic untying or the absence of any genetic 
linkage between the embryo and the parents surged with 
the requirement of anonymity of the donors of the gametes 
for in vitro fertilization and surrogate motherhood. Further 
speculation to this debate has been added when taking into 
account the dissociating effects of new technologies, such 
as the IVR technique (in vitro iterated reproduction) where 
the gametes are generated directly from the embryos and 
mitochondrial replacement technologies that involves genetic 
material from three gametes (Bredenoord et al., 2011). In this 
technique, the intervention is not carried out directly on the 
embryo but on its precursors, e.g. its gametes (Delaney, 2011). In 
all these cases, the result is an embryo genetically disconnected 
from its progenitors either because the gametes used are 
generated in vitro (Palacios-González et al., 2014), or they are 
derived from multiple gametes, or they have been generated 
by iterated reproduction (Sparrow, 2014a). The end result is a 
“genetic orphan,” an individual without living parents, since the 
most immediate ancestor would be deceased embryos (Sparrow, 
2014b); a situation which cannot be assimilated to the natural 
generation of monozygotic twins (Douglas, 2014). The concern 
caused by mitochondrial donations and transfer techniques is 
flagrant generating new legislative doubts about the conditions 
for its application (Ishii, 2014; Harris, 2015), especially regarding 
anonymity (Brandt, 2016). Thus, there is discussion on the 
emergency of a new idea within the human procreation context: 
the abolition of procreative filiation and the possibility of raising 
design individuals without kinship (Palacios-González et al., 
2014; Roache, 2016).
Psychosocial Inequality
The alteration of the social balance has always been a great 
concern for the agents involved in enhancement efforts (Davis, 
1997; Davis, 2009). This has been even more explicit if it could 
affect the future of the child (Sparrow, 2016; Krutzinna, 2017). 
The lack of restrictions makes it possible to foresee the social drift 
that these technologies may cause (Mehlman, 2005; Ishii, 2017b) 
although some authors consider this caution for inequality 
disproportionate (Fenton, 2010) and limit their scope to assess 
of damage that might be predicted after implementation of 
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enhancement interventions (Persson, 2012). Even so, the fear 
of a social disadvantage in unenhanced children is recurrent 
and considered immoral and unjustified due to its potential 
for discrimination (Jensen, 2011), the possible unknown 
consequences in complex thinking and reasoning (Rosoff, 
2011) and other long term secondary effects (Glick, 2011). In 
this sense, the alarm over the application of techniques that we 
do not understand completely or do not know how to control 
(GüellPelayo, 2014), ranges from conditioning and alteration 
of the child’s future (Bredenoord et al., 2014) to a series of 
enhancements that eventually may lead to social fragmentation 
and disintegration (Sparrow, 2015). For the moment, the debate 
has crystallized in the production of legislation that continues 
to be diffuse or even contradictory (De Souza, 2015; Kim, 
2017; Tamir, 2018).
FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS
Germline genetic enhancement presents important challenges 
that should be progressively clarified, mainly to prevent 
reproductive technology from being hijacked by its own 
advances. We must bear in mind that the ultimate reason for 
these initiatives is a concept of elementary ethics: the common 
good and the happiness of individuals. In essence, this is the 
engine that activates actions that promote, limit or regulate 
genetic technologies progress. We understand that a thorough 
argumentation within the ELSI framework, including the 
reprogenetic arena (NHGRI, 2018), would be a way to ensure 
a proper application and implementation of any genetic 
enhancement initiative, whether theoretical or practical. In view 
of the studies reviewed, this working framework would have 
an impact on three fundamental questions where the ethical 
implications of the new technologies are rooted:
a) The moral status of the embryo. The issue was initially 
raised when the technologies that affected the integrity of 
the embryo were implemented pushing the debate about 
its nature and identity (Fox, 2010; DeGrazia, 2012). The 
discussion and social debate about the embryo’s moral status 
became especially relevant when it came to specific issues 
such as the fate of hundreds of thousands of cryopreserved 
embryos, their use for experimentation, the consensual 
arbitrary limitation 14 days for research and the patented 
embryos (Ehrich et al., 2010; Cavaliere, 2017; Chan, 2017; 
Appleby and Bredenoord, 2018). In fact, the fragility of 
this status is what allows the manipulation of embryos 
through genetic editing, provided that they are subsequently 
eliminated and not used in the germline. (De Miguel Beriain, 
2019). More recently, research the creation of transformed 
clones, hybrids, chimeras, and embryoid bodies has added 
a greater uncertainty to a question that remains unclear. It is 
not known exactly what the entity of embryoids, organoids, 
or synthetic embryos may be (Chan, 2017; Kaebnick, 2017; 
Munsie et al., 2017). Society is looking for answers to 
formulate the most elementary question: what is it? or who is 
it? The reflection on the most basic definition of the principle 
of non-contradiction, something cannot be both true and 
not true in the same way and at the same time, pushes the 
debate towards a binary solution. The possibility that there 
may even be allowed the slightest manipulation of embryo 
beings, predictably human, without a defined identity status 
and without any biological linkage with anyone, could lead 
to a profuse and disturbing legislation to coax their adult 
development, whether they be clones, chimeras, enhanced 
chimeras, or enhanced embryos (Mason, 2017; Scott, 2017; 
De Melo-Martin, 2018). In this context, the framework of 
reflection goes beyond the purely scientific or technological 
sphere and invades the anthropological arena. Thus, the 
philosophical framework in it anthropological dimension 
would be the one qualified to define the ontology of beings 
whose status is, apparently, diffuse, as well as their moral, 
social and legal identity (Eberl and Ballard, 2009; Qiu, 2016). 
We consider it essential to determine the ontological status 
of these beings because its clarification will serve as a starting 
point to determine the administration of their destiny, 
either as non-human, their use, their property, or as human 
being, their respect and their rights (Polkinghorne, 2004; 
Streiffer, 2005).
b) The rights of the modified individual. The question of genetic 
enhancement on the germline would not imply special 
obstacles if it were not because it breaks into the most 
intimate sphere of human beings in two dimensions: first, the 
decisions that are made and implemented will be irreversible 
and second, the genetic characteristics are likely not to have 
been chosen by the individual itself but imposed on him/
her, not by nature but by a particular will. This situation was, 
precisely, the scenario that was aimed to avoid: the imposition 
by “nature” on the individual of certain characteristics that 
he or she had not chosen but rather had to accept resignedly. 
Would we be falling again into an injustice? What should be 
done if the modified individual does not accept his modified 
status? It could be argued that it is a scenario similar to an 
individual conceived in a natural way, (e.g. through sexual 
intercourse) who would not accept his/her condition or a 
specific feature (e.g. height, intelligence or even an inherited 
pathology, etc). However, there is an essential difference 
between both scenarios. The natural inheritance cannot be 
imputed to anyone, a key element for legislative purposes 
since the individual is not responsible for it. However, 
modified inheritance is the result of the deliberate action of 
other individuals (e.g. parents or guardians) who decide how 
the child should be. Therefore, they are fully responsible for 
the action carried out in the child with legal responsibility 
(Sundby et al., 2018). In fact, there is general consensus about 
the non-implementation on children interventions with 
serious risks which may be not properly balanced with the 
benefit received from it (Delaney, 2011; Powell and Buchanan, 
2011). It is worth noting that therapies applied to children, 
who cannot agree to an informed consent (e.g. vaccination, 
corrective surgeries, etc) are only ethically justified when 
the benefit is the survival or the integrity of the newborn 
or child. In addition, those therapies should always respect 
their identity and should not lead to the modification or 
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selective destruction of other individuals (Millum, 2014; 
Hendrix et al., 2016).
But the existence of enhanced genes in the newborn inflicts 
characteristics that make that individual unique to himself and 
others (Shapiro, 2005). Here a set of questions come out: did he 
have the right not to be enhanced? Did he have the right to reject 
imposed selection or imposed genes, positive or negative, not by 
the laws of nature but by the will of his managers? Does he have 
the right to a biological filiationties (Malmqvist, 2007; Karpin, 2007; 
De Melo-Martín, 2018)? If these rights existed, they would generate 
a dilemma of difficult solution: the need for an informed consent 
to undergo the enhancement procedure and at the same time the 
right of refusal to be modified (Rodriguez, 2016). Furthermore, 
it would be unclear how to resolve its true biological identity–the 
cause and reason for its origin–and its right to biological filiation, 
a question that has already led to the modification of legislation 
about the anonymity of the donor of the gametes. In brief, will the 
enhanced individual have the right to know his detailed origin? Or 
the purpose of the enhancement carried out in him (Reagan, 2015; 
Sykora, 2015)? The analysis of the right to be a genetically enhanced 
individual is still in its infancy because it has yet materialized. In fact, 
some authors speculate that this right would depend on external 
factors to the individual (Tamir, 2018), an approach that may cause 
additional restlessness. Consequently, we consider it essential to 
exercise extreme caution in all interventions (Holm, 2019), in order 
to generate a truly human technology (Nordberg et al., 2018).
c) The ethical, social and legal responsibility of the enhancement 
agents. The technologies of germline genetic enhancement 
carried out on individuals raise additional questions regarding 
the ownership of the action: Who is accountable for the changes, 
positive or negative, executed in individuals (Rodriguez, 2016; 
Du, 2018)? There are a variety of agents that could be expected 
to be accountable: the parents, the tutors, the researchers, the 
corporations, or even the State (Sparrow, 2016), that is, any 
agent interested in the realization of the enhancement (Millum, 
2014; Kanaris, 2017). This accountability seems similar to the 
responsibility that is acquired when a therapeutic process is 
applied, however the motive and objective of the intervention 
produces a key difference between one and the other. In the case 
of therapies, it is understood that the responsibility is universal 
because it responds to an intrinsic need of every human being: 
the ultimate goal of the intervention is the health improvement 
of the intervened individual (Bonte et al., 2014). Meanwhile, in 
genetic enhancement interventions, these needs are exceeded: 
the enhancement pursues to satisfy the desire of some individuals 
who decide the type of enhancement without clarifying who 
will assume the consequences (Thompson, 2017; Ishii, 2017a; 
Anomaly, 2018). Although some entities (NHGRI, ASHG, and 
ESHG) have expanded their scope of studies and include risk 
assessment, we agree with the authors who consider that these 
measures are insufficient (Mehlman, 2009). Given that germline 
genetic enhancement application occurs at the beginning of 
the living stages of the human being (embryos, newborns, or 
even children), it is especially important to assess the long-term 
psychological and social consequences, with the conviction that 
there are red lines that should not be crossed (Mehlman, 2005; 
Mehlman, 2009; Greenbaum, 2013).
CONCLUSION
It is probable that the desire for specific human enhancement will 
become a reality and, consequently, some agents will implement 
the germline’s genetic enhancement in society. For this reason, we 
consider essential to create effective expert panels and committees 
with society’s feedback (Kaebnick, 2017) that could elaborate global 
normative documents, rooted and established on universal ethical 
principles (Ishii, 2014; Lyon, 2017; De Wert et al., 2018).
The information about the creation of enhanced twins in 
China (Regalado, 2018) reinforces our conviction about the 
need to put forward the underlying reasons that support future 
legislation aimed at prohibiting or allowing enhancements. 
Otherwise, if the different reasons are circumstantial without a 
deep foundation, the laws will be ineffective.
We propose the precautionary principle as a means to navigate 
ethics’ uncertainties and as the point of departure to assess moral 
enhancement. Certainly, an abusive application of the precautionary 
principle would lead to its ineffectiveness. Conversely, that 
precautionary attitude may improve the objectives and the means 
regardless whether it is directed to protect the autonomy of adults, 
the global human welfare or the dignity of the individual. We think 
that these concepts may structure and configure any advance in 
germline genetic enhancement technologies.
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